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Emmaneel: Adoption Law

NOTE
BEYOND WRONGFUL ADOPTION:
EXPANDING ADOPTION AGENCY
LIABILITY TO INCLUDE
A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
AND A DUTY TO WARN

As keepers of the conscience of the community, we cannot coun-

tenance conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance
into the emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from
schemes or tactics designed to discharge societal burdens onto
the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees of the child's destiny
the [adoption agencies are] obligated to act with morals greater
than those found in a purveyor's common marketplace. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Jackson v. Montana,2 the Montana Supreme Court considered whether Montana law allowed adoptive parents to recover for the tort of wrongful adoption and, if so, what duty it
imposed upon adoption agencies. 3 Following the recent deci-

1. Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (Cal. Ct.
App.1988).
2. 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998).
3. See id. at 42.

181
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sions of other jurisdictions, the Jackson court recognized the
negligence-based tort of wrongful adoption in Montana, finding
that both common law and Montana statutory law imposed a
duty upon adoption agencies to accurately represent and disclose information regarding a child's background to adoptive
parents. 4 First, the court held that forseeability and public
policy interests imposed a common law duty upon adoption
agencies to refrain from negligently misrepresenting a child's
background to adoptive parents. 5 Second, the court found that
adoption agencies had a statutory duty to disclose a child's
background to adoptive parents. 6 Finally, the court held that
in order to recover for emotional and financial injuries, adoptive parents need only demonstrate that they would not have
adopted the child had they known of his background. 7
Part II of this note discusses the evolution of the tort of
wrongful adoption. At fIrst, state courts would only allow
adoptive parents to recover for wrongful adoption if they could
prove that the adoption agency's conduct constituted fraud, a
common law tort that requires the adoption agency's conduct to
be intentional. 8 In time, public policy interests, such as the
need for adoptive parents to be emotionally and financially
prepared to raise a special needs child, persuaded state courts
to allow adoptive parents to recover under the less stringent
tort of negligence. 9 As opposed to fraud, a showing of negligence does not require that the adoption agency know its representations are untrue, but merely requires that the adoption

4. See id. at 48-49, 5l.
5. See id. at 48-49.
6. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51.
7. See id. at 52-53. For ease of reference, a masculine pronoun will be used to
refer to an adopted child. The applicable pronoun will be used when referring to a
specific child.
8. See Michael J. v L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988); Reidy v. Albany County of Social Servs., 598 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). But see
Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993); Zernhelt v.
Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Servs., 659 A.2d 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct
1995).
9. See Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N .E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); M.H. v. Caritas Family SerVs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992); Gibbs v. Ernst,
647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994); Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989).
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agency's conduct in regard to the truth be unreasonable. 10 Part
III discusses the facts underlying the decision in Jackson v.
Montana. Part IV explains the procedural history of the case,
including the District Court's opinion and the Jacksons' appeal
to the Montana Supreme Court. Part V details the Montana
Supreme Court's analysis and its focus on an adoption agency's
common law duty to refrain from negligently misrepresenting a
child's background to adoptive parents and its statutory duty to
fully disclose information in its possession. Part VI criticizes
the Montana Supreme Court for failing to read Montana's disclosure statute broadly and suggests that adoption agencies
should be liable for failing to investigate a child's background
and for failing to warn adoptive parents of any health risks
stemming from the child's history. Imposition of such duties
would ensure that adoptive parents are aware of the financial
and emotional burdens likely to result from the adoption of a
special needs child.
II.
BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF WRONGFUL
ADOPTION AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
At common law, adoption agencies did not have a duty to
disclose information regarding a child's familial and medical
history and, as a consequence, were not held liable for their
misrepresentations to potential adoptive parents. 11 The courts
strictly enforced complete anonymity between adoptive and
bIological parents, serving as a philosophical reminder that
adoption was essentially a "rebirth" of an illegitimate child into
a new family!2 However, within the last decade and a half,
courts in many jurisdictions have condemned the historical
code of silence followed by adoption agencies because of its impact on adoptive parents who are unprepared or unable to care
for a special needs child. 13 Instead, these courts have recognized an adoptive parent's right to recover for injuries sus-

10. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 890 (Pa. 1994).
11. See Susan G. James, Disclosure
The Mental Health
Biological Families
In Adoptions, 34 U. LoUiSVILLEJ. FAM. L. 717, 731 (1996).
12. See Laura W. Morgan, Telling The Truth In Adoption Proceedings: Tort
Actions For Wrongful Adoption, 10 NO.1 DIVORCE LITIG. 11 (1998).
13. See James, supra note 11, at 730·731.

Or
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tained due to an adoption agency's misrepresentations. 14 Accordingly, the historical "rebirth" rhetoric has been abandoned
for a more conventional philosophy that promotes communication between an adoption agency and prospective adoptive parents regarding a child's background. 15 This modem philosophy
is based on the belief that it is essential for adoptive parents to
know the medical and familial history of their adopted child in
order to provide adequate care. 16 As a result, in recent years
state courts have been bombarded with claims from adoptive
parents asserting that their child's medical and familial background was not fully disclosed to them by the adoption
agency. 17
Traditionally, adoptive parents had two methods of legal
redress: annulment of the adoption and state statutory remedies. 18 Until wrongful adoption actions were recognized in Burr
v. Board of County Commissioners 19 in 1986, annulment of the
adoption was essentially an adoptive parent's only remedy. 20

14. See id.
15. See Morgan, supra note 12.
16. See id.
17. See Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Roe v. Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. 1992); M.H. v.
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992); Burr v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). This
Note's reference to adoption agencies is meant to include both public and private
agencies.
18. See Pat McDonald-Nunemaker, Wrongful Adoption: The Development Of A
Better &medy In Tort, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 391, 392-393 (1994). Annulment
statutes allow courts to revoke the adoption decree and relieve the adoptive parents of
any legal duty to the adopted child. Annulment proceedings can be invoked by the
biological parents or the adoptive parents, though it is traditionally invoked by
biological parents seeking to regain custody of their children. See Note, When Love Is
Not Enough: Toward A Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1765
(1992). Courts have been wary to allow annulment proceedings in wrongful adoption
cases because they are hesitant to subject children to abandonment twice in their
young lives. See id. at 1766. "Between 1983 and 1987, sixty-nine adoptions in
California were reportedly annulled because county agencies had fraudulently
misrepresented a child's background or mental or physical health." Janet Hopkins
Dickson, The Emerging Rights Of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 917, 946 (1991).
19. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
20. See County Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. App.
1958). Adoptive parents brought action to annul an adoption based on the adoption
agency's fraudulent misrepresentations that the child was in good health. The child
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At first, state courts that confronted allegations of wrongful
adoption "were leery of letting the genie too far out of the bottle" by imposing too much liability upon adoption agencies. 21
Thus, adoptive parents who could not fathom "returning" their
child to an adoption agency, but who, nonetheless, needed assistance with medical bills, had no remedy.22
Recently, however, a growing number of states have begun
to recognize a rather new form of legal redress for adoptive
parents: the tort of wrongful adoption.'1:J A wrongful adoption
cause of action allows adoptive parents to recover monetary
damages for an adoption agency's intentional or negligent misrepresentations regarding a child's familial medical history and
other pertinent information. 24 Adoptive parents may sue an
adoption agency for wrongful adoption upon discovering, or
upon the point at which they should have discovered, that the
adoption agency misrepresented their child's background. 25
Unlike its annulment and state statutory remedy counterparts,
wrongful adoption allows courts to award compensatory and

subsequently suffered from mental retardation, violent tantrums, and engaged in
"serious sex abnormalities." The court granted the annulment because the adoption
agency misrepresented that the biological father committed incest with the child. [d.
at 151·152.
21. John Gibeaut, Disclosing Birth Secrets, A.B.A. J., July 1998, at 35.
22. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 956.
23. As of this writing, states that recognize wrongful adoption include California
(see Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988»; Illinois (see Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. 1992»;
Massachusetts (see Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995»; Minnesota
(see M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992»; Montana (see
Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998»; New York (see Juman v. Louise Wise
Servs., 608 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), affd, 211 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995»; Ohio (see Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986»;
Pennsylvania (see Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994»; Rhode Island (see Mallette
v. Children's Friend and Servs., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995»; Washington (see McKinney v.
State, 950 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1998»; West Virginia (see Wolford v. Children's Home
Soc'y, 17 F.Supp. 2d 577 (S.D. W.Va. 1998»; and Wisconsin (see Meracle v. Children's
Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989». But see Maine (see MacMath v. Maine
Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993» and Mississippi (see Foster v.
Bass, 575 So.2d 967 (Miss. 1990».
24. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34.
25. See McDonald·Nunemaker, supra note 18, at 394.
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punitive damages to adoptive parents and leaves the family
unit intact.26
The fIrst wrongful adoption actions were brought under
fraud theories, which required adoptive parents to prove that
the adoption agencies gave them false information and intentionally deceived them. 27 Unfortunately, adoptive parents
found fraud difficult to prove because the adoption agency's
misrepresentations were not always intentional. 28 Instead,
they began to bring actions based on negligence theories.29 Under negligence-based wrongful adoption, adoption agencies may
be held liable merely for failing to use reasonable care in their
relations with adoptive parents. 30 These cases were also problematic for adoptive parents because courts were hesitant to
impbse unlimited liability on adoption agencies for assuring a
child's future good health. 31 Courts feared that allowing adoptive parents to prevail on negligence theories in wrongful adoption cases would result in "judge-made lemon law for adopted
kids, as well as endless suits taxing the resources of adoption
agencies."32 It wasn't until the early 1990s that courts began to
approve of the less stringent negligence standard as an alternative to fraud. 33 By this time, most states had already begun

26. See id.
27. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 862, 889 (Pa. 1994) (relying on W. PAGE KEETON,
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984)). To prove
fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show the following elements:
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or
false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was
proximately caused by the reliance.
[d.
28. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993).
29. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 35.
30. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890. As opposed to fraud, in order to prove negligent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff need only show that (1) the defendant misrepresented a
material fact; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of the misrepresentation,
or made the "misrepresentation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity"; (3) the
defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) the plaintiff
was injured as a result of his justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation.
See id. (quoting KEETON, supra note 27, § 107, at 745-58).
31. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891.
32. Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 35.
33. See id.
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to impose liability upon adoption agencies by enacting their
own statutes mandating the disclosure of a child's family medical history to his prospective adoptive parents. 34 By 1998, only
a handful of jurisdictions allowed adoptive parents to sue on a
negligence-based theory.35 The Montana Supreme Court joined
these jurisdictions in Jackson v. Montana, agreeing with their
public policy concerns and imposing negligence-based liability
upon adoption agencies for wrongful adoption. 36
WRONGFUL ADOPTION Is INTRODUCED As A FRAUDBASED TORT

A.

As previously noted, the fIrst wrongful adoption claims were
brought under fraud theories. 37 To prove that an adoption
agency was fraudulent in its disclosures or representations regarding a child's background, adoptive parents had to show
that: (1) the adoption agency made a material representation or
disclosure regarding the child's medical or familial background;
(2) the adoption agency made the representation or disclosure
knowing it to be false or with recklessness as to its truth; (3)
the adoption agency intended to mislead adoptive parents into
relying on the representation or disclosure; (4) the adoptive
parents justifiably relied on the representation or the disclosure; and (5) the resulting damages were proximately caused
by the adoptive parents' reliance on the adoption agency's representation or disclosure. 36

34. See id. As of this writing, all states have statutes mandating or permitting
adoption agencies to disclose some medical information to adoptive parents. For a list
of current disclosure statutes, see Morgan, supra note 12, at 12·13.
35. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34. By the time Jackson reached the Montana
Supreme Court, states that recognized negligence·based wrongful adoption included
Illinois (see Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 1101 (Ill. 1992»;
Massachusetts (see Mohr v. Commw., 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995»; Minnesota (see
M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992»; Pennsylvania (see Gibbs
v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994»; Rhode Island (see Mallette v. Children's Friend &
Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995»; and Wisconsin (see Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y,
437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989».
36. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 47 (Mont. 1998).
37. See Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
38. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889.
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In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court became the fIrst state to
recognize the fraud-based tort of wrongful adoption in Burr v.
Board of County Commissioners. 39 In Burr, the adoptive parents accused an adoption agency of fraudulently misrepresenting facts concerning the family medical history of their
adopted son, Patrick. 40 At the time of Patrick's adoption in
1964, welfare officials told the Burrs that Patrick was a
healthy baby born to an unwed mother who had surrendered
him to the state for adoption.41 Years later, Patrick began to
suffer from psychological and learning disabilities. 42 By high
school, Patrick was experiencing hallucinations and was diagnosed with Huntington's Disease, a fatal genetic disease that
attacks the central nervous system. 43 After obtaining a court
order to open Patrick's pre-adoption background fIles, the
Burrs learned that Patrick's mother was a mental patient with
psychotic tendencies and that his father was unknown, although presumed to have been a mental patient as well. 44 Patrick's history placed him at risk for mental illness. 45 The adoption agency did not reveal this information to the Burrs at any
time subsequent to its representation that Patrick was
healthy.46
In its discussion, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that
the adoption agency made material misrepresentations regarding Patrick's medical background with the intention of
misleading the Burrs into relying on the information in their
decision to adopt.47 As a result of their justifIable reliance on
the adoption agency's misrepresentations, the Burrs suffered
damages that they would not have otherwise incurred had the

39. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
40. See id. at 1104.
41. See id. at 1103.
42. See id.
43. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103.
44. See id. at 1104.
45. See id.
46. See id. The court did not indicate whether the Burrs inquired about Patrick's
health at the time of adoption or whether the adoption agency volunteered the
information. However, the court did acknowledge that the agency knew its statements
to the Burrs regarding Patrick's health were false and that the agency had in its
possession Patrick's sealed medical records. See id. at 1105-1106.
47. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1106.
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adoption agency fully disclosed Patrick's background. 48 In concluding that the adoption agency's misrepresentations constituted fraud, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "it would be a
travesty of justice and distortion of truth to conclude that deceitful placement of this infant, known by appellants to be at
risk, was not actionable when the tragic but hidden realities of
the child's infIrmities came to light."49 However, the court emphasized that its decision addressed the "deh1>erate act of misinforming" the adoptive parents and not merely the agency's
negligent "failure to disclose" Patrick's background. 50 Therefore, despite its explicit recognition of fraud-based wrongful
adoption, the Ohio Supreme Court remained hesitant to extend
an adoption agency's liability into the realm of negligence. 51
Recognition of fraud-based wrongful adoption, however, fInally
provided a monetary remedy to adoptive parents. 52
After Burr, courts began to address the public policy concerns as well as the legal implications of wrongful adoption.

48. See id. The court assessed the damages as being ·Patrick's medical expenses
(in excess of $80,000 for the Huntington's Disease treatment alone), together with
other damages." [d. at 1104.
49. [d. at 1107.
50. [d. at 1109. The full excerpt reads:
In no way do we imply that adoption agencies are guarantors of their
placements. Such a view would be tantamount to imposing an untenable
contract of insurance that each adopted child would mature to be healthy and
happy. Such matters are solely in the hands of a higher authority. Adoptive
parents are in the same position as, and confront risks comparable to those, of
natural parents relative to their child's future. Our decision should not be
viewed as altering traditional family relationships and responsibilities, nor
should it be read as shifting part of the burden of parenting to society.
However, just as couples must weigh the risks of becoming natural parents,
taking into consideration a host of factors, so too should adoptive parents be
allowed to make their decision in an intelligent manner. It is not the mere
failure to disclose the risks inherent in this child's background which we hold
actionable. Rather, it is the deliberate act of misinforming this couple which
deprived them oftheir right to make a sound parenting decision and which led
to the compensable injuries.
[d.
51. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109. The adoption agency also claimed that it was
immune from this action since the Burrs were covered by a state statutory remedy that
would allow them to receive a subsidy for adopting a special needs child. However, the
court denied the adoption agency's argument, holding that the statute applied only to
"the knowing placement" of special needs children where both the adoption agency and
thll prospective adoptive parents have agreed to subsidy arrangements before the
finalization ofthe adoption. [d. at 1108-1109.
52. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34.
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The California Court of Appeal was faced with a fraud-based
wrongful adoption case in Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Department of Adoptions. 53 There, an adoptive mother and her
son sued for negligence and fraud, alleging that the adoption
agency misrepresented the son's health. 54 The adoption agency
failed to disclose that the child's physician at the time of adoption "refused to make a prognosis on the child's health" due to a
port wine stain on his face and torso. 55 The child was eventually diagnosed with epilepsy and Sturge-Weber Syndrome, a
genetic degenerative nerve disorder present at birth. 56 The
trial court granted the adoption agency's motion for summary
judgment, holding that it was immune from liability. 57 The
adoptive parents appealed. 68
The Court of Appeal addressed whether the adoption agency
fraudulently failed to disclose material facts that were within
the adoption agency's possession at the time of the child's adoption. 59 Relying on dicta in Burr, the court conceeded that an
adoption agency cannot be deemed the guarantor of a child's
future good health and should not be held liable for negligence
in providing such information. so The court reasoned, however,
that the adoption agency's failure to disclose the doctor's refusal to diagnose the child and the its representation that the
port wine stain was merely a birthmark were material facts
that should have been disclosed to the adoptive parents during

53. 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
54. See id. at 505.
55. [d. The court did not indicate why the physician refused to make a prognosis.
56. See id. at 506. Sturge-Weber Syndrome is identified by an angioma, "a knot
of distended blood vessels overlaying and compressing the surface of the brain." THE
BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 20 (1982). It may cause conditions such as epilepsy
and hemorrhaging and is often associated with a purple birthmark on the face. See id.
Here, Michael was diagnosed as having a port wine stain on his upper torso and face
since birth. See Mich.crel J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505. Based on medical information
known at the time, the adoption agency's doctors should have known that the port wine
stain was a manifestation of this disease. See id.
57. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 511. Eight years earlier, the California Court of Appeal had refused
to recognize a fraud-based wrongful adoption cause of action. See Richard P. v. Vista
Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
60. See id. at 512-513.
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the adoption procesS. 61 Had the adoptive parents known of
these facts before the finalization of the adoption, they would
have been effectively put on notice of the significance of the
doctor's refusal to diagnose the child and, thus, would have
been given an opportunity to conduct an independent background investigation. 62 The court held that the non-disclosure
of such significant facts constituted fraud, and concluded that
an adoption agency must fully disclose, in good faith, material
facts regarding the existing and past medical conditions of the
children it places. 63 The court further noted that public policy
cannot tolerate such blatant concealment or intentional misrepresentations by adoption agencies. 54 As a result, the California Court of Appeal held that the lower court erred in
granting the adoption agency's motion for summary judgment
since the adoption agency's deliberate misrepresentations were
actionable as fraud. 65 Accordingly, the court allowed fraud as a
basis for wrongful adoption. 65
B.

THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEGLIGENCE-BASED ACTIONS

Despite the success of some adoptive parents under fraudbased theories, others found that they could only prevail in
cases that clearly involved intentional misconduct on the part

61. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. The court stated:
Public policy cannot extend to condone concealment or intentional
misrepresentation which misleads prospective adoptive parents about the
unusual calamity they are assuming. The adoption of a child is an act of
compassion, love, humanitarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily
assumes enormous legal, moral, social and fInancial obligations. Accordingly,
a trustworthy process benefIts society, as well as the child and parent. As
keepers of the conscience of the community, we cannot countenance conduct
which would allow persons who desire entrance into the emotional realm of
parenting to be unprotected from schemes or tactics designed to discharge
societal burdens onto the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees of the child's
destiny the agency was obligated to act with morals greater than those found
in a purveyor's common marketplace.
[d.

65. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
66. See id. See also Reidy v. Albany County Dep't of Social Servs., 598 N.y.s.2d
115, 116 (N .Y. App. Div. 1993) (Adoption agency misrepresented that a child was
sexually abused. The New York Supreme Court recognized fraud as a basis for
wrongful adoption).
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of the adoption agency.67 As a result, courts began to acknowledge that public policy interests favored disclosure to adoptive
parents. Slowly, courts recognized adoptive parents' negligence- based claims as acceptable standards under which to
hold adoption agencies liable. 68 As opposed to fraud, which requires the adoptive parents to prove an intentional misrepresentation or omission, negligence requires that adoptive parents show: (1) the adoption agency had a duty to the adoptive
parents to accurately represent or disclose information regarding the child's background; (2) the adoption agency
breached that duty; (3) the adoption agency's breach caused the
adoptive parents to be injured; and (4) the adoptive parents
sustained damages. 69 Thus, negligence-based wrongful adoption claims did not have to rise to the level of intentional fraud
in order to provide adoptive parents a basis for recovery. 70
In 1992, in Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
Springfield,71 the Illinois Appellate Court specifically addressed the issue of whether a common law cause of action
such as negligent wrongful adoption was permissible when no
adoption statute explicitly provided for it. 72 Since adoption is
an area traditionally controlled by state statutory law, the
court was concerned that the statutes might not allow such an
extension. 73 Specifically, the court was concerned that adoption
agencies, being bound by statutory law, could not also be bound
by common law principles. 74

67. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See also MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d
359 (Me. 1993).
68. See e.g., Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989); M.H. v.
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
69. See Jackson, 956 P.2d 35 at 42. These elements are applicable in any
negligence action. See KEETON, supra note 27, § 30, at 164·65.
70. See Thanda A. Fields, Declaring a Policy of Truth: Recognizing The Wrongful
Adoption Claim, 37 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1005 (1996).
71. 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
72. See id. at 357.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 359·360.
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In Roe, three sets of parents sought to adopt children. 75
Each set of parents specifically stated that they would only
consider a physically and mentally healthy child and each requested that the adoption agency provide any iniOrmation
available regarding the child's background. 76 The adoption
agency informed each set of parents that the children were
healthy, but claimed that it did not possess any background
information on the children. 77 In reality, the adoption agency
knew that each of the three children had engaged in uncontrollable and disruptive behavior. 78 Each of the adoptive parents relied on the adoption agency's representations in their
decisions to adopt the children. 79 Furthermore, each child continued to exhibit violent behavior after the adoptions were
complete. 80 The adoptive parents filed a lawsuit against the
adoption agency for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation for failing to disclose the children's psychological and
medical information. 81 The circuit court granted the adoption
agency's motion to dismiss and the adoptive parents appealed. 82
The court of appeal began its analysis by briefly addressing
whether Illinois recognized a cause of action for fraud-based
wrongful adoption. 83 Following previous fraud cases such as
Burr and Michael J., the court concluded that recognition of
fraud-based wrongful adoption was merely an extension of

See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 356.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. Specifically, the adoption agency knew that Jane Roe had seen several
psychiatrists for "violent and uncontrollable behavior as well as intellectual, social and
emotional retardation," Billy Doe exhibited "abnormal behavior such as smearing feces
on the interior walls of past foster homes" and other uncontrollable behavior, and Joe
Boe "displayed destructive behavior in past foster homes such as stomping the family's
dog to death" and suffered from "emotional and social retardation." Id.
79. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 356.
80. See id. The court noted that since being placed with their adoptive parents,
·one child cut the whiskers off the family cat and flattened the mother's tires. Another
child painted a neighbor's house and exposed himself to neighbors. The other child had
severe episodes of violent behavior requiring the aid of professional counseling ... Joe
Boe was institutionalized." Id.
81. See id. at 356.
82. See id. at 357. The court did not indicate what the adoption agency alleged in
its motion to dismiss or what the Circuit Court concluded in its decision to grant the
motion.
83. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 357.
75.
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common law fraud into the realm of adoption law. 84 To avoid
liability, adoption agencies only need to follow the law. 85 The
court reasoned that since statutorily created laws such as corporations are bound by common law principles as well as statutory principles, it would be reasonable to conclude that adoption agencies would also be bound by both common law and
statutory principles. 86 Since the extension of common law
fraud in the adoption context was already recognized in other
states, the court concluded that recognition of common law
negligence for wrongful adoption would not be a radical departure from common law principles. 87 Rather, it would merely be
an extension of common law fraud. 88 Thus, the court concluded
that an adoption agency could be liable for both fraud and negligence. 89
After fmding that common law causes of action for fraud
and negligence applied to statutorily governed adoptions, the
court addressed whether the adoption agency breached its duty
to the adoptive parents by failing to disclose information to
them. 90 The court held that the duty owed in all misrepresentation cases, whether negligent or fraudulent, is the same since
an adoption agency can be liable for failing to provide adequate
information as well as for providing false information. 91 Here,
the adoption agency had a duty to provide honest and complete
responses to the adoptive parents' requests for background information on the children. 92 When the adoption agency failed
to give the adoptive parents the information that it had available, it breached this duty.93 Further, the adoption agency
could reasonably have foreseen the unfortunate consequences
of placing these mentally ill children with parents who were

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
See id. at 360.
See id. at 359.
See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 357.
See id.
89. Sep. id. at 357, 366.
90. See id. at 36l.
91. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 36l.
92. See id. at 365.
93. See id.
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unaware of any problems. 94 Accordingly, the court reversed the
lower court's dismissal, rmding that the adoptive parents had
stated claims for both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 95
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also addressed the issue of
negligent misrepresentation in the adoption setting in M.B. v.
Caritas Family Services. 96 There, the adoption agency claimed
that the plaintiffs appeared to be willing to adopt any child
that was not seriously mentally ill. 97 The adoption agency provided the plaintiffs with background information that indicated
the child's biological family was generally healthy.98 However,
the adoption agency mentioned on several occasions that there
was a possibility of incest in the child's family.99 After the child
was placed with the plaintiffs, he began to exhibit jumpy and
nervous behavior.loo At the request of the child's psychologist,
the adoption agency sent the adoptive parents information
about the child's genetic background. 101 This information indicated that the adoption agency knew from the beginning that
the child's biological parents were a 17-year old boy with mental health history, and his 13-year old sister.l02
The plaintiffs alleged that the adoption agency negligently
misrepresented the child's familial background by failing to
fully and accurately disclose what it knew. 103 The adoption
agency moved for summary judgment on public policy grounds,
claiming that recognition of common law negligent misrepre-

94. See id. In noting that the burden should be placed on the adoption agency
since it has the information, the court said that "the consequences of placing that
burden on defendant is defendant discloses what information it has in response to an
adopting parent's inquiry, so that adoptive parents assume the awesome responsibility
of raising a child with their eyes wide open." [d.
95. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 366. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the adoptive parents' breach of contract claim since their allegations and the relief
prayed for sounded in tort rather than contract law. See id.
96. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
97. See id. at 284.
98. See id. at 285.
99. See id.
100. See Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 285.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 286.
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sentation would place an unreasonable burden on adoption
agencies by requiring them to confIrm every child's familial
backgroWld. 104 The adoption agency further claimed that imposition of such liability upon adoption agencies would inevitably
discourage adoptions of hard-to-place and special needs children.l05 The lower court denied the adoption agency's motion. 106
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed
whether public policy precluded them from holding an adoption
agency liable for negligently misrepresenting a child's medical
and familial backgroWld. 107 The court acknowledged the adoption agency's concerns, but recognized the compelling need for
adoptive parents to be informed of background information
known to the adoption agency in order to obtain adequate care
for the child and to make personal family decisions. lOS The
court held that imposition of a duty upon adoption agencies
only requires that they exercise due care in disclosing a child's
history fully and adequately to avoid misleading potential
adoptive parents. 109
Here, the adoption agency was aware from the beginning
that the child's biological parents were siblings. 110 The court
concluded that once the adoption agency disclosed the possibility of incest to the adoptive parents, it assumed a duty to ensure that the disclosure was complete and adequate. 111 Thus,
after finding that public policy did not preclude them from
holding an adoption agency liable for negligent misrepresentation, the court found that the adoption agency was liable for
wrongful adoption in negligently misrepresenting the child's
background. 112

104. See Caritas, 488 N.w.2d at 286.
105. See id. at 287.
106. See id. at 288.
107. See id.
108. See Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 287.
109. See id. at 288.
110. See id. at 287.
111. See id. at 288.
112. See Caritas, 488 N.w .2d at 288. The court denied the H's intentional
misrepresentation claim since there was no evidence that the adoption agency intended
to mislead the H's by withholding background information. See id. at 289.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also addressed the issue
of a negligence standard in the adoption arena in Gibbs v.
Ernst. 113 When the Gibbses sought to adopt, they indicated
that they would adopt a child who was hard to place due to age,
but specifically requested a child that had not been exposed to
physical or sexual abuse.ll4 The adoption agency placed 5 yearold Michael with the Gibbses, disclosing that he was hyperactive, behind in school, and had been verbally abused by his
biological mother. lUi After the fmalization of the adoption, the
adoption agency assured the Gibbses that it disclosed all the
information it had regarding Michaefs background. 116 Immediately after the adoption, Michael began to exhibit violent behavior towards other children.ll7 Once it became evident that
Michaefs behavior would not change, he was placed in the custody of the Department of Ruman Services (DRS). 118 Shortly
thereafter, the Gibbses learned from a DRS caseworker that
Michael had been severely sexually and physically abused by
his biological mother, had a history of violence towards children, and had been in ten foster homes before being placed
with the Gibbses. 119 The Gibbses sued the adoption agency for
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and for negligent
non-disclosure. l20
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court fIrst addressed whether
Pennsylvania should extend the common law torts of fraud and
negligence to the adoption setting. 121 The court focused on the
competing interests of adoption agencies and adoptive parents. l22 It recognized the prospective parents' interest in

113. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
114. See id. at 884.
115. See id. at 884-885.
116. See id. at 885.
117. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 885. The court indicated that Michael "attempt[ed) to
amputate the arm of a five year old; attempt[ed) to suffocate his younger cousin;
attempt[ed) to kill another cousin by hitting him over the head with a lead pipe;
deliberately plac[ed) Clorox in a cleaning solution causing Ms. Gibbs to burn her hands
badly; and startled) a fire which seriously injured a younger cousin." [d.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 885-886. The court noted that at one point, Michael's biological
mother "attempted to cut off his penis." [d.
120. See id. at 886.
121. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 886.
122. See id.
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knowing as much as possible about the health and familial history of the child they want to adopt.l23 The court also balanced
the parents' interests against the interests of the adoption
agencies. 124 It recognized that adoption agencies might face a
reduction in successful adoptions if courts placed too much liability upon them. l25 However, the court concluded that regardless of the adoption agency's concerns, the traditional
common law causes of action for both fraud and negligence apply to adoptions despite the statutory nature of adoption proceedings.126 The court explicitly held that under a fraud theory,
the adoption agency had an "obligation to refrain from fraudulent and deceitful tactics."127
Further, the court held the cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation applicable as well, expanding an adoption
agency's liability for negligence to "those conditions reasonably
predictable at the time of placement. "128 The court reasoned
that the increased burden on adoption agencies under causes of
action for negligence was mitigated by the requirement that
adoption agency efforts only be reasonable. l29 Additionally, the
adoption agency may simply avoid making any representations
at all if the burden seems overwhelming. l30 Thus, the court
held that the Gibbses had a cause of action against the adop-

123. See id. at 886-887.
124. See id.
125. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 887.
126. See id.
127. [d. at 890. The court stated:
We require no less from every other business or non-profit organization in this
Commonwealth, and see no valid reason to release adoption intermediaries
from the burden of truth in their daily operations. Indeed, we fmd it
particularly apposite in this context because of the potentially devastating
consequences that can result from fraudulent conduct here.
[d.
128. [d. at 891. The court stated it would
in no way imply that adoption agencies are insurers or warrantors of a child's
health. The tort we now recognize is not similar to, nor can it be compared
with products liability or contractual warranties. Adoption agencies must
merely use reasonable care to insure that the information they communicate is
accurate.
[d.

129. See Gibbs. 647 A.2d at 891.
130. See id.
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tion agency for both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation of Michael's background. 131
Once it seemed evident that courts were willing to allow
both fraud-based and negligence-based wrongful adoption
claims, adoptive parents who could not prove fraud began to
sue solely for negligence. One such ,case was Mallette v. Children's Friend & Service. 132 In Mallette, the adoption agency
told the Mallettes that Christopher's biological mother suffered
from learning disabilities caused by head trauma she sustained
as a child. l33 Several years after the adoption, the Mallettes
learned that the adoption agency had a report on fIle regarding
Christopher's medical and familial background, which confumed that his biological mother was moderately retarded. 134
The report acknowledged the possibility that head trauma
caused the mother's mental retardation, but indicated that
there were no medical records to support such a conclusion. 135
By the time Christopher was thirteen years old, he was diagnosed as mentally retarded and severely disturbed. l36 The
Mallettes sued the adoption agency for negligently misrepresenting and omitting important information regarding Christopher's background. 137 The Superior Court denied the adoption
agency's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a

131. See id. at 892. The court also held that the Gibbses stated a cause of action for
negligent non-disclosure since the unique relationship between the adoption agency
and the adoptive parents imposed a duty upon the adoption agency to fully disclose all
relevant non-identifYing information regarding a child's background. See id. at 893.
The court refused to recognize that an adoption agency had an affirmative duty to
investigate a child's background since such a duty would place an undue burden on
adoption agencies that had yet to be recognized by any other state, See id. at 894. See
also Zemhelt v. Lehigh County Office of Children & Youth Servs., 659 A.2d 89, 90-91
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (adoption agency was not liable for its intentional
misrepresentations to adoptive parents because Pennsylvania law prohibits local
agencies from being held liable for fraud).
132. 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1992).
133. See id. at 68.
134. See id.
135. See id. The Mallettes also learned that the child's biological mother was
diagnosed with macroephaly, pseudoepicanthal folds, a high arched palate,
tachycardia, hand tremors, and poor coordination. See id.
136. See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 68.
137. See id.
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claim. l38 The adoption agency appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. 139
The Rhode Island Supreme Court fIrst addressed whether
Rhode Island should recognize claims against adoption agencies for negligent misrepresentations made to adoptive parents. 140 Relying on Gibbs and Caritas, the court concluded that
an adoption agency may be held liable for its negligent misrepresentations to adoptive parents. 141 The court held that once
the adoption agency began to volunteer information to the
Mallettes, it assumed a duty to refrain from negligently misrepresenting information regarding Christopher's background. 142 By misinforming the Mallettes of Christopher's familial history, the adoption agency breached its duty.l43 Further, since the Mallettes relied on the adoption agency's misrepresentations, they were denied the opportunity to adopt a
child that would not require special care. 144 Accordingly, the
court held that the Mallettes had a viable claim for negligent
misrepresentation. 145
The court further addressed whether public policy interests
precluded recognition of negligence-based wrongful adoption. 146
The court agreed with the decisions in Gibbs and Caritas that
recognition of such a cause of action would promote public policy without making adoption agencies the guarantors of a
child's future good health.147 The court held that an adoption
agency could either avoid making representations at all or
could simply represent a child's background non-negligently. 148
Moreover, the court held that an adoption agency's duty to
adoptive parents would only apply to conditions that were fore-

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id. at 69.
See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 70.
See id. at 70-71.
See id. at 71.
See id.
See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 71.
See id.
See id. at 72.
See id. at 72-73.
See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 73.
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seeable at the time the adoption took place. 149 Thus, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court denied the adoption agency's appeal and
remanded the case to the Superior Court, fmding that the
Mallettes stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.l50
Following this line of cases, recent court decisions have used
wrongful adoption policy concerns to impose negligence liability
for failing to comply with state disclosure statutes. Not long
before the Montana Supreme Court addressed the issue in
Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court in McKinney v. Washington 151 held that an adoption agency can be held liable for
negligence-based wrongful adoption for negligently failing to
comply with mandatory disclosure laws. In 1988, the McKinneys applied to adopt Abby despite learning from a caseworker
of the possibility that Abby was born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), was sexually abused, and/or was mentally retarded. 152 The McKinneys applied for public subsidies provided
to those who adopt special needs children. l53 In 1992, two years
after the adoption was fmalized, the McKinneys received the
adoption agency's records which indicated that the agency
knew as early as 1984 that Abby's problems might have been

149. See id.
150. See id. The court noted that:
We are of the opinion that an adoption system based on fairness and fuller
disclosure of nonidentifying information concerning the child remains the
ideal. We believe our decision moves us a small step closer to such an
aspiration. If the adoption agency undertakes to make representations to
adopting parents, fairness dictates that they do so in a nonnegligent manner.
Conversely, if the adoption agency remains silent in the face of adopting
parents' inquiries, the parents will at least be alerted that any decision to
adopt should be made ever more cautiously. We note that the need for
accurate disclosure becomes more acute when special-needs children are
involved ... we believe extending the tort of negligent Imislrepresentation to
the adoption context will help alleviate some of the artificial uncertainty
imposed on a situation inherent with uncertainty.
[d.
151.

950 P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. 1998).
152. See id. at 463. The McKinneys were friends with Abby's foster parents and
babysat her on weekends for about a year. At the time that they applied to adopt her,
the McKinneys knew that Abby had 20 to 30 temper tantrums per day, did not talk or
play with other children, was lethargic, was in special education programs and
counseling, was removed from her biological mother because of neglect and possible
sexual abuse, lived in several foster homes, and was developmentally delayed. See id.
153. See id.
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caused by her biological mother's alcohol abuse and that Abby
was thought to have Down's Syndrome. l54 After Abby was officially diagnosed with F AS in 1993, the McKinneys fIled a complaint against the adoption agency, claiming that, had they
accurately known Abby's full history, they would not have
adopted her. l55 The court addressed whether adoptive parents
could sue an adoption agency for failing to disclose a child's
familial history. 156
Using Washington's disclosure statute as a guide, the court
reasoned that despite the statutory obligation of adoption
agencies to disclose certain information to potential adoptive
parents, public policy also requires such a duty. 157 The unique
relationship between adoptive parents and the adoption agency
created a duty to disclose even if the statute did not provide for
it.l58 The court agreed with the policy considerations discussed
by other state courts and concluded that the adoption agency
was only required to make reasonable efforts to disclose information within its possession. 159 As a result, the court found
that the adoption agency had a duty to disclose what it knew of
Abby's background once the McKinney's became prospective
adoptive parents. l60 However, the court further held that even
though the adoption agency may have breached this duty, its
breach was not the proximate cause of the McKinneys' injury
since the agency's disclosure would have only confIrmed what
the McKinneys already knew about Abby's history. 161 Thus,
although the McKinney's could not recover, the court concluded
that an adoption agency's negligent failure to comply with the
state disclosure statute and public policy concerns in disclosing
a child's background information may result in liability if the
adoption agency failed to use reasonable efforts. 162 The next

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
disclose

See id. at 464.
See McKinney, 950 P.2d at 464.
See id.
See id. at 466.
See id.
See McKinney, 950 P.2d at 467468.
See id. at 468.
Seeid.at471.
See id. at 465. The court also decided that an adoption agency's duty to
attaches once a person interested in adopting a child reaches the "prospective
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court to address negligence-based wrongful adoption was the
, Montana Supreme Court in Jackson v. Montana.

III.

FACTS OF JACKSON v. MONTANA

Eugene and Peggy Jackson adopted Aaron in 1986. 163 After
Aaron began to show severe behavioral and psychological
problems, the Jacksons learned that, at the time of the adoption, state social workers withheld psychological reports on
Aaron's biological mother and the state adoption agency lied
about Aaron's biological background.l64 The Jacksons sued the
state adoption agency in Montana state court for negligently
misrepresenting and negligently failing to disclose Aaron's
medical and familial background. 165
A

THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS

Deborah Annette Russell (hereinafter "Russell") gave birth
to John Allen Russell, who was renamed Aaron Jon Jackson
(hereinafter "Aaron") by his adoptive parents, on November 8,
1983. 166 Russell spent most of her pregnancy incarcerated in
Montana. 167 During her pregnancy, psychological evaluations
conducted by clinical psychologists characterized her as "emotionally immature and inappropriate," as "making marginal
psychological adjustments," and as "disorganized, unconventional, diffused, [and, at times], delusional."l68 She was eventually diagnosed with "borderline intellectual functioning and
inadequate personality. "169
In 1983, Robert Stevens, one of Aaron's possible biological
fathers, was treated as an inpatient at the Veterans Admini-

adoptive parent status." Id. Here, the McKinneys became prospective adoptive
parents when the adoption agency approved the McKinneys' request for subsidies,
thereby formally recognizing the McKinneys' eligibility to adopt Abby. See id. at 468.
163. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 40 (Mont. 1998).
164. See id. at 40-4l.
165. See id. at 4l.
166. See id. at 39.
167. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 40.
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stration Medical Center in Wyoming. 170 His doctor diagnosed
him with "schizophrenic disorder, paranoid type."171 The State
obtained copies of these evaluations prior to placing Aaron for
adoption. 172
A year after Russell's evaluation was conducted, Aaron,
then two months old, was hospitalized for aspiration after Russell fed him carbonated soda, meat, and vegetables. 173 The
State then ordered that it provide child protective services to
Russell and Aaron. 174 A state social worker noted that Russell
had a low IQ and ''function[ed] as though she [was] retarded."175
The social worker concluded that Russell was mentally disturbed and in need of professional counseling. 176 In addition to
the social worker's evaluation, the State arranged for a psychologist to perform a psychological evaluation on Russell. 177
The psychologist ultimately diagnosed Russell with "Paranoid
Personality Disorder with mild mental retardation."178
In August 1984, Dave Wallace, a social worker employed by
the State, submitted a report to the court detailing Russell's
psychological evaluations, studies, and reports. 179 In his report,
Wallace suggested that, due to Russell's psychological problems, Aaron should be separated from her to ensure his physical and emotional well being. 180 Based on Wallace's report, the

170. See id. at 39.
171. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. No other information regarding Aaron's two possible
fathers is given in the court's opinion.
172. See id.
.
173. Seeid.
174. See id. The court's opinion did not indicate what services were actually
provided to Russell and Aaron.
175. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39.
176. See id.
177. See id. The psychologist determined that many patients with clinical profiles
similar to Russell's often have chronic emotional problems and paranoid personality
disorders. See id.
178. [d.
179. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39.
180. See id. In 1984, Wallace also provided the court with this statement:
As shown below, this worker sees little positive change in Deborah Russell
Scott from 1980 to the present time. As demonstrated again and again in
these reports, Debbie appears to be unable to control her anger, personal
relationships, or her life, even with the threat of losing her child. In deference
to the severity of breaking a mother·child bond, it is determined by this
worker that such a break is the only reasonable recourse to assure [Aaron Jon
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court terminated Russell's parental rights, as well as the parental rights of Aaron's two possible fathers, and awarded the
State permanent custody ''with the right to consent to his adoption."181

B.

THE ADOPTION

In November 1983, the Jacksons submitted an adoption application to the State. 182 As part of the application process, the
Jacksons participated in several personal interviews with state
resource worker Betty Petek. l83 During these interviews, the
Jacksons advised Petek that they could not provide for a child
who had a mental disorder or who might be at risk for developing one. l84 The Jacksons also indicated that they did not
want to adopt a child whose familial background included
''heavy drug or alcohol use during pregnancy."I85 After completing the necessary pre-adoption home study, Petek submitted her recommendation that the Jacksons be approved for the
adoption, noting that they were willing to consider adopting a
child with a "minor correctable handicap."I86 In May 1984, the
State followed Petek's recommendation and approved the Jacksons' request to become adoptive parents. 187 Soon thereafter,

Jackson) his rights to an adequate physical and emotional environment to
promote natural development ....
Brief for Appellant at 13, Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998) (No. 96-688).
181. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. The court's opinion does not indicate what reasons the Jacksons may
have given for their inability to adopt a mentally ill child. The court only emphasized
that the Jacksons would have chosen not to adopt Aaron had they known of his family
background. See id. at 52. However, the Jacksons' brief indicates that, because of
personal experience, they were concerned "about the mental stability of the prospective
adoptive child [and) the mental health of the child's biological family." Brief for
Appellant, supra note 180, at 15.
185. Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 15.
186. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. The court did not indicate what the home study
entailed.
187. See id. at 39-40. Neither the court nor the Jacksons' brief indicated any other
reason for the State's approval of the Jacksons' adoption application. At this point, the
Jacksons had only been approved to become adoptive parents. Aaron was not available
for adoption until September 1984. See id. at 39.
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the Jacksons were advised that Aaron was available for adoption.l88
In January 1985, the Jacksons met with Petek and Wallace
to discuss the adoption, Aaron's family background, and initiating visits with him. 189 At this meeting, the Jacksons explicitly asked Wallace and Petek whether Aaron's familial history
indicated that he would be at risk of developing a mental illness. l90 The Jacksons also asked for information concerning
possible familial drug or alcohol abuse. 191 Despite their direct
inquiries, Wallace and Petek told the Jacksons that Aaron was
separated from his biological mother because she came from a
"multi-generation welfare family" that was "socially inept" and
could not care for him. l92 The Jacksons were also told that
Aaron was hospitalized for aspiration after being fed solid food
and soda. l93 However, although Wallace and Petek were each
aware of the social study and the psychological reports regarding Aaron's biological parents at the time of the meeting,
neither of them disclosed the content or the existence of these
evaluations when responding to the Jacksons' inquiry. 194
Wallace had some of the reports, including his own report to
the court, in his possession at the time of the meeting. 195 When
asked what the mother was like, Wallace and Petek told the
Jacksons that she was physically healthy, that there was a
possibility of minimal drug use before she was incarcerated,
and that she did not meet Aaron's needs nor did she show an
interest in learning the skills necessary to take care of him. 196

188. See id. at 39.
189. See id. at 40.
190. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40.
191. See Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 17.
192. [d.
193. See id. The Jacksons were also told that "although there may have been a
possibility of some drug usage it was minimal since Debbie had been incarcerated for
most of her pregnancy." [d.
194. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40. The court did not indicate why this information
was withheld from the Jacksons.
195. See id. "The State itself has admitted that it did not provide the Jacksons
with information regarding either the birth mother's or putative fathers' psychological
or emotional functioning." Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 18.
196. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 40. The court did not indicate what Aaron's needs
were at this time. However, the inference was that Aaron's biological mother did not
know how to care for any child, healthy or otherwise.
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The district court fmalized Aaron's adoption in January 1986. 197
At no time prior to the adoption did the State disclose the records to the Jacksons. 198
By December 1987, Aaron had already begun to exhibit behavioral problems. l99 The Jacksons admitted Aaron to the
Child Study Center in Montana where he was evaluated by Dr.
Paul R. Crellin.2OO Dr. Crellin concluded that Aaron suffered
from significant hyperactive attention deficit disorder, noting
that it was impossible to attribute the disorder to either a genetic trait or to the substance abuse in which Aaron's biological
mother engaged during her pregnancy.201
After Dr. Crellin's evaluation, Aaron had a "continuing history of psychological and emotional problems."202 Clinical psychologists who evaluated Aaron in the years following Dr.
Crellin's report at the Child Study Center diagnosed Aaron
with various psychological problems. 203 Such diagnoses included attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity and without hyperactivity in 1989, psychotic disorder in 1991 after hospitalization in a youth psychiatric hospital, and pervasive developmental and learning disorders in 1994. 204 Aaron was also

197. See id. The court noted that the Jacksons visited Aaron numerous times and,
in March 1985, entered into an adoptive placement agreement with the State.
However, the court did not indicate who was caring for Aaron at this time or what
contact the Jacksons had with Aaron between the time they entered into the adoptive
placement agreement in 1985 and the time the District Court finalized Aaron's
adoption in 1986. See id:
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40. The court indicated that Dr. Crellin performed a
pediatric neurological evaluation. See id.
201. See id.
202. [d. at 41.
203. See id.
204. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41.
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a nervous disorder that
usually affects children. The condition is characterized by very high levels of
physical activity, consistently impulsive and immature behavior, and an
extremely short attention span ... Although ADHD does no physical damage to
the body, it can trigger long-lasting social, emotional, and educational
problems ... [affected children] often appear to be immature, uncoordinated ...
Some children may have attention deficit without hyperactivity. These
children are more difficult to recognize .. , however, emotional problems can
still develop ... The cause of ADHD is not known, but several theories have
been proposed ... The condition may be the result of a [nervous system
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rehospitalized at the psychiatric hospital twice in 1992 and, as
of the time the court heard the case, had since been under the
continuous care of a child psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist.205
In late 1992, the Jacksons asked the State for assistance
subsidies to care for Aaron.206 They claimed that as a result of
Aaron's severe psychological problems, they were "devastated
fmancially and physically and emotionally exhausted. "207 On
behalf of the Jacksons, Petek requested that the State provide
them maximum support.208 In her request, Petek wrote that
"the current information available indicated that [Aaron is]
suffering from conditions that are directly related to [his] biological family history. In researching the file, it appears that
given the information then available it was, at best, naIve on
our part in failing to assist these families."209 Subsequently, in
1995, a neuropsychological evaluation found that Aaron exhibited schizophrenic characteristics and that heredity was a significant factor in this diagnosis. 210
IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 1994, the Jacksons filed a negligence action in the
Thirteenth Judicial District Court against the State of Mon-

malfunction, damage to the fetus during pregnancy, complications in
childbirth, or inheritance) ... ADHD appears to occur more commonly in
children of mothers who drank excessively or used cocaine during pregnancy.
FAMILY MEDICAL HEALTH GUIDE, 513·514 (1996).
205. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 4l.
206. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 25.
207. [d. at 25.
208. See id.
209. [d.
210. Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 23. Dr. Joseph K. McElhinny, the
neuropsychologist, also concluded that "long term, outside-the-home placement in a
residential child care facility may have to be considered for Aaron in the future. He
will remain a difficult child to care for. His management may become impossible as he
becomes older and larger." [d. Aaron was also seen for a genetic consultation with Dr.
John J.ohnson and Dr. Jeff Shaw at the Department of Medical Genetics. They
concluded that "Aaron appears to have an organic psychiatric disorder, which will
likely evolve into schizophrenia. His behavior patterns fit many diagnoses ... it is
likely that he will have a life long disability related to his borderline psychosis and
intellectual functioning and this may well become a more obvious problem as he gets
older." [d. at 24.
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tana, the Department of Family Services, and employees of the
·Department of Family Services.2l1 The Jacksons claimed that
the State was in breach of contract212 and that it was liable for
negligent misrepresentation, negligent disclosure, and negligent supervision for its misrepresentations and omissions regarding Aaron's familial background. 213
In August 1995, the State flled a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the Jacksons failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact as to each count of their complaint.214 In November 1995, the Jacksons amended their complaint, dropping the breach of contract claim215 and adding another cause of action for "negligence based upon the doctrine of
informed consent."216 The Jacksons brought suit as individuals

211. Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 41 (Mont. 1998).
212. See id. A breach of contract is defined as "a failure to perform any promise
which forms the whole or part of a contract." Marci J. Blank, Adoption Nightmares
Prompt Judicial Recognition of the Tort of Wrongful Adoption: Will New York Follow
Suit?, 15 CORDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1691, n.19 (1994). Here, neither the court nor the
Jacksons' brief indicated what the breach of contract claim entailed or how the State
allegedly breached a contract with the Jacksons.
213. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. See also KEETON, supra note 27, § 33, at 205-207:
Liability in negligence sometimes rests upon some form of misrepresentation
on the part of the defendant, by which the plaintiff, or some third person, has
been misled to the plaintiff's damage ... In all cases of negligent
misrepresentation, however, the circumstances must be such that the
defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in giving
the information, and that reliance upon what he says, with resulting danger,
is reasonably to be expected.

[d.
In many situations, a failure to disclose the existence of a known danger may
be the equivalent of misrepresentation, where it is to be expected that another
will rely upon the appearance of safety ... the person who promises and then
fails to pass on information important to another's welfare ... may be held
liable to the person with whom he deals, or to others to whom harm is to be
expected through that person's reliance.
[d., § 33, at 207-208. Here, the Jacksons alleged that the State was negligent in its
disclosures and representations regarding Aaron's background and in its supervision
over the adoption proceeding. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. See also Brief for
Appellant, supra note 180, at 2.
214. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41.
215. See id. In it's Motion for Summary Judgment, the State requested a dismissal
of the Jacksons' breach of contract claim "on the grounds that Montana law [did} not
recognize a cause of action for breach of contract in the adoption context ... The
Jacksons voluntarily conceded to" this motion. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 180,
at 2-3.
216. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. The Jacksons alleged that as potential adoptive
parents "they were not given full and accurate non-identifying information on [Aaron}
as mandated by common law and statutory law, thus, denying them the opportunity to
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and as "parents and next of friends of Aaron Jon Jackson."217
The State renewed its motion for summary judgment in April
1996 and filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment,
alleging that: (1) the Jacksons "failed to state a cla:im upon
which relief can be granted on behalf of Aaron"; (2) the State
did not have a duty to disclose all information regarding
Aaron's background; and (3) the failure to disclose the information did not cause the Jacksons' injuries. 218
In November 1996, the district court granted the State's
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the Jacksons proved neither that the State had a duty to disclose nor
that, even if a duty existed, the State's breach caused their injuries. 219 In granting summary judgment to the State, court
. concluded that the Jacksons did not prove that the State had a
common law or statutory duty to fully disclose Aaron's psychological and medical background to them, and thus was not liable for negligent nondisclosure.220 With regard to the Jacksons' negligent misrepresentation claim, the district court held
that the Jacksons could not meet their burden of proving that
the State had a duty to disclose Aaron's background to them. 221
The court reasoned that the Jacksons "failed to demonstrate
the requisite element of foreseeability. "222 The district court
further reasoned that the Jacksons failed to show that the
State "knew or should have known" that withholding Aaron's
psychological and medical background from the Jacksons would
result in injury.223 Thus, the district court concluded the Jacksons did not fulfill their burden of establishing that the State

make an informed decision about the adoption." Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at
4.
217. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 4l.
218. Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 4. The State also alleged that the
Jacksons' claims were barred by the three year statute of limitations imposed on tort
claims. The district court entered an order determining that there existed "a genuine
issue of material fact of when the Jacksons discovered or should have discovered the
cause of the injury which they claim they suffered and whether the withholding of the
information prevented them from discovering the cause of injury." [d. at 4-5.
219. See id. at 5.
220. See Jackson, 956 P.2d. at 43.
221. See id. at 47.
222. [d.
223. See id.
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had a duty to inform them of Aaron's familial or medical history.224
The Jacksons appealed this decision directly to the Montana
Supreme COurt.225 The Montana Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the district court erred in its conclusions that: (1) the State did not have a common law or statutory duty to disclose information regarding Aaron's background
to the Jacksons; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed "regarding a causal connection between the State's allegedly negligent conduct and the Jacksons' injuries."226
V.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Jacksons claimed that the district court
erred in determining that the State did not have a common law
or statutory duty to fully and accurately disclose all nonidentifYing background information about Aaron that would
have assisted them in their decision to adopt him. 227 The Jacksons also claimed that the district court erred in determining
that they failed to establish that the State's alleged negligent
breach was causally connected to Aaron's mental condition. 228
The Jackson court began its analysis by questioning
whether Montana should recognize a negligence-based cause of
action for wrongful adoption.229 Following Gibbs v. Ernst and
Mallette v. Children's Friend and Service, the court fIrst required a determination as to whether traditional common law
causes of action such as negligence should be applied to adoption cases.230 After fInding that foreseeability requirements
and public policy interests imposed a common law duty upon
the State to refrain from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's
background, the court turned to Montana's disclosure statutes

224. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 47.
225. See id. at 41. In Montana, rmal judgments from the District Court are
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-20-72 (1997).
226. Jackson, 956 P.2d. at 38.
227. See Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 1.
228. See id.
229. Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 43 (Mont. 1998).
230. See id. at 42 (citing Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1994».
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to determine whether the State also had an independent statutory duty to disclose certain information to the Jacksons. 231
The court decided that Montana's disclosure statutes and the
State's own policy manual together imposed a statutory duty
upon the State to fully and accurately disclose any information
that it had regarding Aaron's background.232 Finally, the court
discussed the causal connection between the State's alleged
negligence and the injuries sustained by the Jacksons, holding
that the State did not demonstrate a lack of causal connection.233
A.

THE RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENCE-BASED WRONGFUL
ADOPTION

The primary issue addressed by the Montana Supreme
Court in Jackson was whether Montana law should recognize
wrongful adoption claims.234 The court reviewed the holdings of
other state courts that found wrongful adoption claims to be
mere extensions of common law actions of fraud and negligence.235 It then decided that determining whether Montana
should recognize the tort of wrongful adoption rested on
whether an adoption agency had a common law duty to refrain
from negligent misrepresentation or a statutory duty to fully
disclose a child's background to adoptive parents. 236
Since the Jacksons' complaint was negligence-based, the
court fIrst addressed whether the State had a legal duty to the
Jacksons. 237 The State contended that it did not have a common law duty to refrain from misrepresenting Aaron's background because it did not mislead the Jacksons.238 The State
further argued that imposition of any duty to disclose, whether

231. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 49.
232. See id. at 50-51.
233. See id. at 51-53.
234. See id. at 42.
235. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 42. See also discussion supra part II.
236. See id. at 42-43.
237. See id. In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that a
duty existed, the duty was breached, the breach caused injury, and the plaintiff
sustained damages. See id.
238. See id. at 43.
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common law or statutory, would conflict with Montana's statutory duty to keep the biological parents' medical records confidential. 239 As a result, the Montana Supreme Court discussed
an adoption agency's duty to disclose under common law and
statutory law separately.240 The court began its analysis by
inquiring whether the State, having in its possession information regarding Aaron's medical and familial background, had a
common law duty to avoid negligently misrepresenting Aaron's
background to the Jacksons during the adoption process. 241
The court then addressed whether Montana's disclosure statutes mandated that the State fully and accurately disclose to
the Jacksons all it knew of Aaron's background. 242

1.
Common Law Duty To Refrain From Negligent Misrepresentation
In determining whether the State had a common law duty
to refrain from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background to the Jacksons, the court noted that Montana had
"long recognized the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation. »243 To prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim,
the Jacksons were not required to show fraud or intent to misrepresent on the part of the State. 244 Instead, the Jacksons
only had to show that the State failed to use reasonable care in
its representations regarding Aaron's background. 245 The court
emphasized that a duty to use reasonable care was a required
element in all actions for negligent misrepresentation. 246 The
existence of this duty was based on both the foreseeability that
Aaron would develop emotional or psychological problems and
the underlying policy concerns regarding the State's liability. 247

See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 43.
See discussion infra part V.B for the court's analysis regarding an adoption
agency's common law duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation. See discussion
infra part V.C for the court's analysis regarding an adoption agency's statutory duty to
disclose.
241. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 42.
242. See id. at 51.
243. [d. at 43.
244. See id.
245. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 43.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 44-48.
239.

240.
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Accordingly, the court examined each of these factors separately.
a.

Foreseeability

In determining whether the State could have foreseen that
Aaron would eventually develop emotional and psychological
problems, the court relied on the holding in Gibbs that an
adoption agency could only be liable for conditions that the
agency could have reasonably predicted at the time of adoption. 248 In accordance with Gibbs, the Montana Supreme Court
held that the State could only be found to have a duty of due
care to the Jacksons if it was reasonably foreseeable that Aaron
was at risk of developing mental health problems based on his
familial history. 249 However, the court made it clear that the
Jacksons only had to show that it was reasonably foreseeable
that a genetic link existed between Aaron's health problems
and those of his biological parents.250 They did not have to
prove the presence of a genetic link with "absolute scientific
and medical certainty.''251 The court noted that the State's own
witness, Dr. John Talbot Blodgett, testified in a deposition that
there was enough medical knowledge in the early 1980s to understand the biological risks to Aaron. 252 The court held that,
based on what the State knew about Aaron's background at the
time of the adoption, it could have reasonably foreseen that
Aaron might eventually develop psychological and emotional
problems. 253
b.

Public Policy

The court next addressed whether public policy required
that a duty be imposed upon the State to refrain from negli-

248. See id. at 47 (citing Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994)).
249. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 48.
250. See id.
251. [d.
252. See id. Dr. Blodgett testified that "given the diagnoses of the mother and the
putative father ... that even by 1980, '82, '83 standards, that there was enough known
of familial patterns that we understood that there were significant biological risks to
people who were first degree relatives to people with those diagnoses." [d.
253. See Jackson, 956 P .2d at 48.
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gently misrepresenting Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 2M
The Montana courts had not yet considered the public policy
considerations regarding the State's duty to use due care in
adoption disclosures.255 In addressing the issue, the court relied on Gibbs and Mallette, both of which recognized negligent
misrepresentation claims in adoption situations.256 These jurisdictions found that the adoption agency had a duty to use
due care in disclosing a child's medical and familial history to
potential adoptive parents. 257 The Montana Supreme Court
noted that, in recognizing that such a duty exists, the decisions
of other jurisdictions rested heavily on whether the adoption
agency had voluntarily begun to disclose information regarding
the child's health to the potential adoptive parents.258 Once the
adoption agency began to disclose, it then had a duty to use due
care so as not to misrepresent facts regarding the child's background. 259 The Montana Supreme Court also recognized that
virtually all of the courts that addressed wrongful adoption discussed whether the adoption agency's duty to use due care existed under common law. 260 To do this, other jurisdictions balanced various conflicting policy concerns. 261
The Montana Supreme Court followed the reasoning in
Gibbs, highlighting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's considerations regarding public policy. 262 The court concluded that
the imposition of a duty to use due care in disclosing a child's
background would ensure that adoptive parents are fmancially
and emotionally able to raise the child, thereby preventing
failed .adoptions resulting from placement of special needs chil-

254. See id. at 44.
255. See id.
256. See id. See also Mallette v. Children's Friend and Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I.
1992); Gibbsv. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa.1994).
257. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 44.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 44.
262. See id. at 44·45. The court analyzed the facts and rationale of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). See also discussion
supra Part III.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

35

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3

216 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:181
dren with families unable to cope with them. 263 The court further relied on Mallette, reasoning that an adoption agency
must only refrain from volunteering any representations at all
to avoid liability or, at the very least, to make representations
non-negligently. 264
In the instant case, the State conceded that the Jacksons
were warned of possible drug or alcohol use by Aaron's biological mother at the onset of her pregnancy, that she was unable
to care for him, and that she had caused him to be hospitalized
for aspiration when he was an infant. 265 The Jacksons were
further told that Aaron's biological mother was from a welfare
family, but that she was physically healthy.266 Joining the majority of courts that considered the issue of negligent misrepresentation in wrongful adoption cases at the time of its decision,267 the Montana Supreme Court concluded that recognizing
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation would promote the desirable public policy of allowing adoptive parents to
be fully aware of the potential future needs of the child. 268
Agreeing with the conclusions of other courts that the determination hinged on the adoption agency's voluntary offering of
information,269 the court further concluded that once the State
began volunteering information to the Jacksons, it "assumed a

263. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 45 (citing Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 887). The court did not
go into any more detail regarding this issue. However, the portion of Gibbs that the
court cites stated that "ignorance of medical or psychological history can prevent the
adopting parents and their doctors from providing effective treatment, or any
treatment at all." Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 886-887.
264. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 45-46. Here, the court analyzed the facts and
decision of Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995).
265. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 46.
266. See ill.
267. See discussion supra Part II.
268. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 46.
269. See id. The court wrote:
This court has similarly recognized the fundamental principle that, where a
person undertakes to do an act or discharge a duty by which the conduct of
another may be properly regulated and governed, he is bound to perform it in
such a manner that those who are rightfully led to a course of conduct or
action on the faith that the act or duty will be duly and properly performed
shall not suffer loss or injury by reason of negligent failure so to perform it.
Id. (quoting Stewart v. Standard Publ'g Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936».
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duty to do so with due care. "270 Although the court recognized
that its decision placed a higher burden on the State, it felt
that this burden was justified by the need for adoptive parents
like the Jacksons to receive as much information regarding a
child's medical and familial history as the adoption agency has
available. 271 The court noted that as a result of holding adoption agencies to a higher standard of care, public trust in State
agencies and public confidence in the adoption process would
inevitably increase.272 The court concluded that "public policy
considerations justify the imposition of a duty upon the State
in the present case. "273
Consequently, the court held that once the State began volunteering information regarding Aaron's medical and familial
history, it assumed a duty to use due care in its representations to the Jacksons. 274 Thus, the State had a duty to abstain
from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background. 275 Further, the court found that whether or not the State breached
that duty by negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background
was a genuine issue of material fact and, as such, reversed the
district court's grant of the State's motion for summary judgment. 276 Accordingly, the court recognized the common law
cause of action of negligent misrepresentation as a viable claim
in a wrongful adoption case. 277

2.
The Statutory Duty To Refrain From Negligent NonDisclosure
After finding that an adoption agency had a common law
duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation, the court
next addressed whether the State had a statutory duty to fully

270. [d. at 46. " ... to require anything less from the State than the exercise of due
care in the dissemination of information in its possession to prospective adoptive
parents would be simply unacceptable." [d.
271. Seeid. at 47.
272. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 47.
273. [d.
274. See id. at 48-49.
275. See id. at 49.
276. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49.
277. See id.
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disclose Aaron's medical and familial history to the Jacksons. 278
The Jacksons claimed that such a duty existed pursuant to the
Uniform Adoption Act of Montana, which required the State to
disclose "all available non-identifying information" regarding a
child's familial background. 279 The State, on the other hand,
argued that it fulfIlled its limited duty of disclosure under
Montana Code Annotated (MCA) section 40-8-122(1)(c), which
did not mandate that any parental history be disclosed to adoptive parents, but merely required that the medical and social
history of the child be provided. 28O The State contended that
since Montana statutory law prevented it from disclosing psychological reports of Aaron's biological parents, it satisfied its
statutory duty when it disclosed general information about
Aaron's background to the Jacksons.281
The court conceded that MCA section 40-8-122(1) did not
specillcally set out criteria regarding what information an
adoption agency had to include in the medical and social histories it provided to potential parents. 282 However, the court rejected the State's argument, fmding that the State's own policies and procedures manual fIlled in the gap.283 The manual

278. See id.
279. [d. The court did not explain which provision of the Uniform Adoption Act of
Montana the Jacksons claimed to be applicable. nor did in go into further detail about
the Act.
280. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49. Section 40-8-122 of the Montana Code provided
that:
(1) Upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court shall order an
investigation to be made by the [State] or by a licensed child-placing agency or
other person named by the court ... The report of investigation shall be filed
with the court by the investigator at the time the petition is filed or within 30
days from the issuance of the order for investigation. unless the time therefor
is extended by the court. The report of the investigation shall state: ... (c) that
medical and social histories have been provided to the adoptive parent.
[d. In 1997. the adoption statutes applicable at the time Jackson was decided were
repealed and replaced by the Montana Adoption Act. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 42-1101- 42-1-111 (1997).
281. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49.
282. See id. at 50.
283. See id.
The Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services Policies and Procedures
Manual § CSD-SS 602-1 specifically provide[d] that: Preparation for adoptive
placement is a team process involving the child with his social worker. foster
parents. birth parents. adoptive parents. and resource worker. The child's
social worker is the primary person in the process ... The child and his
adoptive family need to have all available information on the child and his
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specifically acknowledged the need for adoptive families to
have any information available to the adoption agency regarding a child and his biological background.284 Further, MeA section 40-8-122(1)(c) mandated that adoption agencies provide
adoptive parents with the child's "medical and social histories."285 The court found that, together, these two provisions
created a statutory duty upon the State to "fully and accurately
disclose all relevant. information, including psychological reports, regarding an adoptee and his or her [biological] family."286
The State further argued that the version of MeA section
41-3-205 in effect at the time of Aaron's adoption precluded it
from disclosing information regarding child protection services
files without a court order authorizing it. 287 The court found
this argument lacked merit.288 Instead, the court concluded
that two options were available to the State.289 First, the State
could have tried to obtain a court order, thus allowing it to
comply with MeA section 41-3-205, as well as its own policies.290 Doing so would have allowed the State to disclose information contained in Aaron's child protection services files,
which included his biological mother's psychological evaluations, to the Jacksons.291 Alternatively, if the State had been
denied an order, it could have informed the Jacksons that due
to their concerns regarding Aaron's medical background they

birth family. This information shall include: (1) Background information on
biological parents ... ; (2) Daily schedules ... ; (3) Child's Social Study with
identifying information removed; (4) Current child's medical record ... ; (5) Life
story book; (6) Psychological evaluation; (7) School records; and (8) Social
Security number.

[d.
284. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50 (quoting The Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services Policies and Procedures Manual § CSD-SS 602-1).
285. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50. This version of section 40-8-122(1)(c) of the Montana
Code was in effect at the time of Aaron's adoption. See supra note 280.
286. [d.
287. See id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (1985)). This section of the
Montana code was also repealed and replaced by the Montana Adoption Act. See supra
note 280.
.
288. See id.
289. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50.
290. See id.
291. See id.
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might want to consider adopting another child.292 Had the
State engaged in such a procedure, it would have maintained
confidentiality while at the same time notifying the Jacksons
that Aaron's medical and familial background increased his
risk of developing psychological problems. 293 The court thus
concluded that the State had a statutorily imposed duty to disclose to the Jacksons all relevant factors regarding Aaron's history.294 Since the allegation that the State breached a duty to
the Jacksons constituted an issue of material fact, the court
reversed the district court's grant of the State's motion for
summary judgment. 295
B.

CAUSATION

After rmding that the State had a common law duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation and a statutory duty to
"fully and accurately disclose" information regarding Aaron's
background, the court next addressed the issue of causation. 296
The district court held that the Jacksons did not establish that
"the State's conduct helped 'produce the injury complained of'
because [they] failed to adequately demonstrate that 'the information allegedly withheld by the [State] relative to the child
and his heredity [was] causally connected to the child's current
medical condition.'''297 Specifically, the Supreme Court questioned whether the district court erred in concluding that the
Jacksons failed to prove that the State's'conduct in withholding

292. See id.
293. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50.
294. See id. at 51.
295. See id. Before turning to causation, the court briefly discussed rules
concerning motions for summary judgment. See id. The court noted that since the
State was the party moving for summary judgment, it had the initiai burden of proving
that the Jacksons had not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact existed.
See id. Only after the State satisfied its burden would the burden shift to the Jacksons
to show that "by more than mere denial and speculation" a genuine issue of material
fact did exist. [d.
296. [d. In order for a plaintiff to recover for the negligence of another party, the
plaintiff must not only demonstrate that the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff.
but also that there exists "some reasonable connection between the act or omission of
the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." KEETON. supra note
27, § 41. at 263.
297. Jackson. 956 P.2d at 51.
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or misrepresenting information contributed to the Jacksons'
injuries. 298
The State argued that in order to prove causation, the Jacksons had to prove that the information allegedly withheld
"relative to [Aaron] and his heredity" helped produce Aaron's
condition.299 The Jacksons, on the other hand, contended that
they only needed to satisfy the traditional "but for" test. 3OO This
test required the Jacksons to establish that, but for the State's
misrepresentation of Aaron's psychological and familial background, "the Jacksons would not have adopted Aaron and, consequently, would have suffered no injuries."301 Based on Montana case law, the court agreed with the Jacksons' contention
that in order to prove causation, they only had to satisfy the
"but for" test by establishing that the State's conduct helped
produce their injuries and that they would not have suffered
injuries at all but for that conduct.302

In order to complete its causation analysis, the court next
identified the Jacksons' injuries. 303 In their amended complaint, the Jacksons sought compensatory damages for the severe emotional and fmancial injuries they suffered as a result

298. See id.
299. Id.
300. See id. The "but for" test is used to determine tort liability by ascertaining
whether "the event would not have occurred but for [the defendant'sl conduct;
conversely, the defendant's conduct is not the cause of the event, if the event would
have occurred without it." KEEToN, supra note 27, § 41, at 266.
301. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51.
302. See w.. at 52. The court discussed its decision in Busta v. Columbus Hospital
Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 139 (Mont. 1996), in which it decided that it would "no longer
consider forseeability as an element of causation." Busta, 916 P.2d at 139. Instead, the
court in Busta held that "in those cases which do not involve issues of intervening
cause, proof of causation is satisfied by proof that a party's conduct was a cause-in-fact
of the damage alleged." Id. As stated in KEETON, supra note 27, § 41, at 266, a party's
conduct "is a cause-in-fact of an event if the event would not have occurred but for that
conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event
would have occurred without it." Id. The court went on to note that in Busta, the court
decided that "the appropriate causation instruction is as follows: 'The defendant's
conduct is a cause of injury if it helped produce it and if the injury would not have
occurred without it.''' Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51-52 (quoting Busta; 916 P.2d at 139).
303. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52.
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of the adoption. 304 In its decision, the district court defmed the
Jacksons' injuries solely as ''the emotional distress and financial responsibility for medical attention."305 However, the Supreme Court found this description inaccurate, explaining that
the district court's interpretation of injuries was not what the
Jacksons claimed. 306 Rather, the Jacksons' general claim was
that, as a consequence of the adoption, they suffered emotional
and fmancial damages. 307 These damages, they argued, were
due to the State's misrepresentation and withholding of information regarding Aaron's background. 308 As a result of the
State's negligent conduct, the State prevented the Jacksons
from making an informed decision, thereby causing them to
adopt a child that they would not have otherwise adopted. 309
In response, the State argued that whether or not the Jacksons would have continued with the adoption had they known
of Aaron's background was not the issue. 310 However, the court
disagreed, noting that decisions from several other jurisdictions, including the courts in Burr and Mallette, also considered
whether the adoptive parents would have adopted the child
despite the adoption agency's misrepresentations. 311 If proven,
the court concluded that any emotional or fmancial hardships
the Jacksons suffered necessarily resulted from the State's
negligence. 312
Having concluded that the element of causation rested on
whether the Jacksons would not have adopted Aaron but for
the State's misrepresentations and withholding of information,
the court acknowledged that the State would not be held liable

304. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint to the District Court at 7-8, Jackson
v. Montana, (No. DV 94-372 (1995)).
305. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52.
306. See id.
307. See id. The court did not specify what the emotional and fmancial damages
were.
308. See id.
309. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 52-53. The court acknowledged that many of the courts in
jurisdictions that addressed wrongful adoption did not discuss the issue of causation.
See id.
312. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53.
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for future medical conditions that it in no way could predict. 313
It further cautioned against holding any adoption agency responsible for guaranteeing a child's future health. 314 The court
noted that the foreseeability requirement demanded by an
adoption agency's common law and statutory duties precluded
imposition of such liability. 315 Thus, the court held that the
district court relied on an incorrect causation standard, having
focused on foreseeability.316 As a result, the court concluded
there remained an issue of material fact as to whether the
Jacksons would have adopted Aaron had the State refrained
from allegedly withholding or misrepresenting Aaron's background.317
C.

THE COURTS CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court joined the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing the negligence-based tort of wrongful adoption, finding that both common law and Montana statutory law
imposed duties upon the State.3lS First, the court held that
foreseeability and public policy requirements imposed a common law duty upon the State to refrain from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 319 Based on
what the State knew about Aaron's background, it could have
reasonably foreseen that Aaron would eventually develop emotional and psychological problems. 320 Further, public policy required that once the State began to divulge information to the
Jacksons, it assumed a duty to use due care in its representations. 321 Second, the court found that Montana's disclosure

313. See id. at 52. The court used the development of diabetes as an example of a
future medical condition that an adoption agency could not predict. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. See discussion supra V.B.1.
316. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 53.
317. See id. The court did not address the issue of proximate cause. The court
probably did not address the issue because foreseeability. which is often used to
determine proximate cause. is no longer recognized as an element of causation in
Montana. See Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp .• 916 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1996). See also
KEETON. supra note 27. § 42. at 273-274.
318. Jackson. 956 P.2d at 48-49. 51.
319. See id. at 47-48.
320. See id. at 48.
321. See id. at 47.
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statute, in conjunction with the State's adoption policy manual,
imposed a duty to fully and adequately disclose what it knew
regarding Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 322 Finally, the
court held that the Jacksons could prove that the State's alleged withholding of information and misrepresentations were
causally connected to their emotional and financial injuries by
demonstrating that they would have elected not to adopt Aaron
had the State adequately disclosed his biological history to
them. 323 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, rmding that the Jacksons established a
viable cause of action for negligence-based wrongful adoption,
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 324

IV. CRITIQUE: MONTANA CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED
NEGLIGENCE-BASED WRONGFUL ADOPTION BUT DID
NOT EXPAND AN ADOPTION AGENCY'S LIABILITY FAR
ENOUGH
Although all states have enacted disclosure statutes, most
only require minimum disclosure by adoption agencies. 325 Montana's disclosure statute is no exception. Although the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the State had a duty to
refrain from negligent misrepresentations in the adoption context, it did nothing more than leave minimum disclosure re-

322. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51.
323. See id. at 53.
324. See id. at 53. (Trieweiller, J., concurring). Justice Trieweiler agreed with the
result, but disagreed with the court's analysis. He concluded that once the court
determined that the State had a statutory duty to disclose Aaron's background, it was
unnecessary to decide' whether such a duty existed at common law. Such a
determination would encourage trial courts to analyze on a case by case basis whether
a causal connection exists between the information an agency withheld and the
illnesses that a child develops "when, in fact, such an analysis is irrelevant to the
establishment of a duty imposed by statute in Montana." Id. at 53-54. Justice
Trieweiler also stated:
We have previously held that statutes establish a duty. It is assumed that
when the Legislature enacts statutes, or administrative agencies enact rules,
they do so because of the foreseeability of harm if the statute or rule is not
followed. It is also assumed that statutes, and administrative rules which are
consistent with those statutes, are a reflection of public policy in Montana.
Id.
325. For example, California's disclosure statute requires only that an adoption
agency "effectuate the effective and discrete transmission to adoptees or prospective
adoptive parents of pertinent medical information ... ." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8608 (West
1984).
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quirements intact. As the court noted, the disclosure statute in
effect at the time it decided Jackson required an adoption
agency to investigate and provide adoptive parents with a
child's medical and social histories. 326 However, the State
pointed out that Montana's disclosure statute did not specify
what information or documents an adoption agency was required to include in the medical and social histories that it was
to provide. 327 Further, Montana's disclosure statute did not
require an adoption agency to disclose a child's familial psychological background. 328

In analyzing an adoption agency's duty to disclose under
Montana statutory law, the court did not go far enough. Instead of taking advantage of the opportunity to interpret Montana's disclosure statute broadly, the court chose to rely on the
State's policy manual in conjunction with the plain language of
the statute.329 The plain language of the statute alone, mandating that adoption agencies provide adoptive parents with a
child's medical and social histories,330 provided the court with
ample opportunity to broadly expand statutory adoption agency
liability.

326.
read:

The disClosure statute in effect at the time Jackson v. Montana was decided

(1) Upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court shall order an

investigation to be made by the [State) or by a licensed child·placing agency or
other person named by the court ... The report of investigation shall be filed
with the court by the investigator at the time the petition is filed or within 30
days from the issuance of the order for investigation, unless the time therefor
is extended by the court. The report of the investigation shall state: ... (c) that
medical and social histories have been provided to the adoptive parent ....
See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 49 (Mont. 1998). Montana's current disclosure
statute reads: (1) "the [agency) shall provide a prospective adoptive parent with social
and medical histories of the birth families; (2) in direct parental placement adoption,
the birth family social and medical histories must be completed on a form .... n MONT.
CODE ANN. § 42·3·101 (1997).
327. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 49.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 50.
330. See id.
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A.

INTERPRETING DISCLOSURE STATUTES To REQUIRE
DISCLOSURE OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION

The Montana Supreme Court should have interpreted the
disclosure statute broadly by increasing disclosure requirements, demanding nothing less than disclosure of all available
information concerning the child's background. Extensive disclosure is necessary to allow adoptive parents to consider all
factors before making a life-long commitment to care for a
child. 331 Such disclosures should include specific and detailed
information regarding the physical and mental health history
of the child and his extended biological family. 332 Since many
illnesses skip generations or lie dormant, specific disclosures
would educate adoptive parents about the potential needs of
their child, allowing them to better prepare for the child's future. 333 Additionally, such disclosures would ensure that a
child, when grown, would know his biological history.334 Even
though non-adoptive birth parents do not receive a disclosure
statement in the delivery room, most know, or at least have the
opportunity to fmd out, the physical and mental histories of
their extended families. Adoptive parents should be afforded
the same opportunity.
B.

EXPANDING ADOPTION AGENCY LIABILITY To INCLUDE A
DuTY To INVESTIGATE AND A DuTY To WARN

Although Montana's disclosure statute required adoption
agencies to perform an investigation regarding a child's medical and social histories, the Montana Supreme Court did not
defme what that investigation should entail or what informa331. See James, supra note 11, at 744 (recommending that state legislatures create
broader disclosure statutes).
332. See id. at 724 (recommending mandatory background reports).
333. See Dickson, supra note 22, at 945. For example, a child born to an HIVpositive mother may test positive for HIV antibodies for up to 15 months after birth
regardless of whether he actually carries the virus. On the other hand, children who
test negative for HIV may simply be in the early stages of the virus' development.
Further, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome mayor may not manifest in children born to alcoholic
mothers. See id. at 963 n.246.
334. This author concedes that some tests may not accurately predict an illness nor
can it be guaranteed that a child will develop an illness at all. See James, supra note
11, at 723.
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tion it should produce. The increasing number of wrongful
adoption claims in recent years suggests that state disclosure
statutes alone are inadequately protecting adoptive parents
and their children. 335 As part of the adoption process, adoption
agencies should be required to make reasonable investigations
into the backgrounds of all children put up for adoption and
should have a mandatory duty to warn prospective parents of
the risks inherent in adopting a special needs child.

1.

Duty to Investigate

The Montana Supreme Court should have imposed upon
adoption agencies a specific duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a child's background. Admittedly, the determination
of what and how much investigation constitutes a reasonable
investigation under the circumstances can ultimately result in
subjective analyses by state courts since there is no bright line
rule. 336 However, courts have often been faced with standards
that lack a bright line rule, as is the case with any negligence
standard. 337 Despite the absence of a bright line rule, courts
can decide which factors should be considered when determining if the adoption agency's investigation was reasonable. 338
Such factors should include, but of course are not limited to,
practicality of birth parent interviews, release of records concerning previous state intervention, and opportunities for doctor's examinations, medical tests, and psychological evaluations. 339
The Montana Supreme Court was not the first court to
avoid the issue of an adoption agency's duty to investigate. To
date, all state courts that have addressed wrongful adoption

335. A Berkeley Study indicated that, as of 1991, one-half of the parents who
adopted sexually abused children, one-third of the parents who adopted physically
abused children, and one-third of the parents who adopted children with learning
disabilities were not informed of their child's condition by the adoption agency at the
time of the adoption. See Dickson, supra note 22, at 946.
336. See When Love Is Not Enough, supra note 18, at 1773.
337. See id. (acknowledging that adoption investigations of abandoned children will
ultimately produce less, if any, information than will an investigation of a child whose
custody has been awarded to the state years before his adoption).
338. See id.
339. Seeid. at 1773-1774.
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have been reluctant to impose a duty to investigate upon adoption agencies.340 The court in Gibbs explicitly declined to impose such a duty, choosing instead to rely on the Pennsylvania'
statute's implication that a good faith effort to obtain a child's
medical record was sufficient. 341 The Gibbs court suggested
that a duty to investigate would impose an undue burden on
adoption agencies, strain resources, and reduce the number of
successful adoptions. 342
Imposition of a duty to perform a reasonable investigation
in good faith, however, would not unduly burden adoption
agencies. First, the increased burden imposed upon adoption
agencies is outweighed by the burden that adoptive parents
unknowingly assume when they adopt a special needs child. 343
Second, although adoption agencies will have a duty to investigate, such a duty would not require any more than a reasonable inquiry into the child's background. 344 For example, a reasonable investigation might include the child's genetic background as well as doctor evaluations based on a standard
physical and psychological examinations. 345 Accordingly, adoption agencies could protect their interests while at the same
time providing complete and accurate information to adoptive
parents by issuing a disclaimer of any information that was not
included in the investigation or any tests that were not performed. 346 As a result, adoptive parents would be able to make
an informed decision regarding the adoption and might be
more likely to adopt knowing that they are educated about the
fmancial and emotional risks involved in adopting the child. 347

340. See Robert J. Baker, Gibbs v. Ernst: Pennsylvania Recognizes Negligent
Nondisclosure In Wrongful Adoption Cases, 31 TORT & INS. L. J. 103, 109 (1995).
341. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882,894 (Pa. 1994).
342. See id.
343. See Kelly Bennison, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma, 16 NOVA
L. REV. 909, 923 (1992) (noting that "the denial ofthe opportunity to make an informed
decision is the essence of the tort of wrongful adoption").
344. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 964.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See id. Dickson writes:
This system would give adopters the means to weigh the risks in the same
manner as biological parents yet would insulate agencies from liability except
where they had failed to carry out their responsibilities or purposely misled
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In addition, a duty to investigate a child's background would
not burden adoption agencies any more than the thorough investigations of potential adoptive parents that adoption agencies already undertake. 348 Often, adoption agencies develop
methods to screen potential adoptive parents. 349 These methods include psychological and social criteria that significantly
limit the type of people that can successfully apply for adoption. 350 If adoption agencies are already engaging in such thorough investigations to select potential adoptive parents, they
can clearly perform similar investigations to ensure that the
people who survive the strict acceptance process are adequately
able and prepared to care for a special needs child. 351 Although
such investigations can be expensive, many states require that
expenses, even those incurred while investigating the adoptive
parents, are paid by the adoptive parents themselves. 352 Thus,
a reasonable investigation into a child's background would cost
the adoption agency little, if anything at all. 353

2.

Duty to Warn

Although the Montana Supreme Court did not address
whether an adoption agency has a duty to warn adoptive parents of a child's background, state courts should impose such a
duty. Had the Jacksons been warned of Aaron's risk of developing a mental illness, they might have chosen not to adopt a
special needs child, thereby avoiding severe financial and emotional damages. 354 As with the duty to investigate, courts have

adopters. Such policies would not make agencies guarantors of a child's future
good health; rather, they would encourage candid disclosure and adequate
assessments of children.
[d.

348. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 954 (noting that such tests include "evaluations
of their ability to parent, personality tests, a required medical examination, a criminal
records check, and fingerprinting").
349. See id. (citing Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values
in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7, 21-22 (1964)).
350. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 954.
351. See id.
352. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-129(c), which states that "the actual and reasonable
cost of providing information pursuant to this section shall be paid by the person
requesting the information."
353. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 955.
354. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 35.
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been reluctant to hold adoption agencies liable for failing to
warn adoptive parents of future potential health problems of
their children. 3M However, imposition of a duty to accurately
relay information is not a new concept in tort law and is required in many situations. 356
For example, courts have repeatedly held that physicians
have a duty to warn patients if they learn of dangerous side
effects after prescribing medication. 357 Courts have similarly
held that psychotherapists have a duty to warn third parties if
a patient threatens to kill a specific person. 358 In a remarkable
decision in New Jersey, an appellate court held that a physician had a duty to warn his patient's daughter that she had an
increased risk of developing cancer, concluding that "a duty to
warn of avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of justice."359 The court went on to say that the duty to
warn is not only owed to the patient, but also to any of the patient's immediate family members who might suffer as a result
of a physician's breach. 360 Likewise, in the adoption context,
the duty to warn shoUld not only be owed to the child to ensure
his adequate care, but also to the adoptive parents who will
inevitably suffer as a result of the adoption agency's failure to
warn.

355. See 2 AM. JUR, 2d Adoption § 163 (1994).
356. See Wanda M. Temm, Out Of Sight, Out Of Mind, But Not Out Of Duty:
Adoption Agency's Duty To Disclose Medical Information To Birth Parents PostRelinquishment, 63 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 359, 363 (1995).
357. See, e.g., Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (doctor's
failure to warn of dangerous side effects of the Dalkon Shield was a negligent breach of
duty to warn).
358. See e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. 1976)
(upon determination that patient presents a danger of violence to a third party,
psychotherapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim).
359. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
360. See id. The court wrote:
We need not decide, in the present posture of this case, how, precisely, that
duty is to be discharged, especially with respect to young children who may be
at risk, except to require that reasonable steps be taken to assure that the
information reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their
benefit .
. Id.
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Similarly, the duty to warn has been extended in wrongful
birth claims to physicians who failed to adequately inform parents of any pregnancy risks. 361 Most courts that have heard
wrongful birth claims have upheld their validity under the notion that there is no justification for a system that deprives
parents of the opportunity to know of the risks inherent in
their pregnancy while at the same time forbidding them from
recovering the cost of treating and caring for the ill child that is
bom.362 The heart of the wrongful birth tort is the denial of a
parent's opportunity to make an informed decision regarding
the termination of her pregnancy.363 The heart of the wrongful
adoption tort is the same; adoptive parents should also be allowed to make intelligent decisions regarding their ability to
care for a child whom they wish to adopt.3&! As in wrongful
birth claims, there is no justification for a system that deprives
potential adoptive parents of the opportunity to know of the
risks inherent in an adoption while at the same time forbidding
them to recover the cost of treating and caring for the ill child
that is adopted. Had the Jacksons been warned of Aaron's risk
of developing a mental illness, they might have chosen not to
adopt a special needs child, thereby avoiding severe fmancial
and emotional damages. 365

VII.

CONCLUSION

Following the decisions of other jurisdictions, the court in
Jackson v. Montana recognized the negligence-based tort of
wrongful adoption, fmding that both common law and Montana
statutory law imposed a duty upon adoption agencies to accurately represent and disclose information regarding a child's
background to adoptive parents. 366 First, the court held that
forseeability and public policy interests mandated a common
law duty upon adoption agencies to refrain from negligently

36l. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence Of Wrongful Adoption As A Cause Of
Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 486 (1989).
362. See id. at 487.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53.
366. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 48-49, 51 (Mont. 1998).
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misrepresenting a child's background to adoptive parents. 367
Second, the court found that adoption agencies had a statutory
duty to disclose a child's background to adoptive parents. 368
Finally, the court held that adoptive parents can recover for
emotional and financial damages by demonstrating that they
would not have adopted the child had they known of his background. 369
Although the Montana Supreme Court recognized an adoptive parent's right to be informed of a child's background before
committing to an adoption, it did not extend an adoption
agency's liability far enough. Rather than address the extent
to which an adoption agency may be held liable to adoptive
parents under Montana's disclosure statutes, the court elected
to rely on the State's adoption policy manual to fill in the
gaps.370 The court was presented with the opportunity to mandate that adoption agencies disclose all available information
about a child's background, but chose instead to leave Montana's mjnjmum disclosure requirements intact. 371 The court
declined to impose more stringent requirements upon adoption
agencies, including a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into a child's background or a duty to warn adoptive parents of possible illnesses to which a child might be susceptible.
Acceptance of wrongful adoption claims has finally provided
recourse to unwitting adoptive parents faced with having to
care for physically and psychologically disabled children due to
the negligence of adoption agencies. Adoptive parents are no
longer forced to decide whether to annul the adoption or to incur the substantial costs of caring for a special needs child.
Hopefully, as more state courts accept wrongful adoption as a
viable claim for adoptive parents, they will begin to impose
more responsibility upon adoption agencies by increasing their
liability to adoptive parents. Determining the extent of an
adoption agency's future liability will become crucial as the

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See id. at 47-48.
See id. at 51.
See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53.
See id. at 50-51.
See id.
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numbers of adopted children born to drug-addicted or HIVpositive mothers continues to increase. 372 Courts must lead the
way by imposing increased responsibility upon adoption agencies. It is crucial for them to remember that an adoption
agency's "denial of [an adoptive parent's] opportunity to make
an informed decision is the essence of the tort of wrongful
adoption. "373

Jennifer Emmaneez*

372. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34.
373. Bennison, supra note 343, at 923. For a decision after Jackson, see Wolford v.
Children's Home Soc'y, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.W. Va. 1998). There, the court applied
the wrongful adoption analysis to an agency that allegedly failed to disclose that the
adopted child had Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. See id. In finding that the adoptive
parents had a viable claim for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, the court
noted its dissatisfaction with the term wrongful adoption. See id. Rather, the court
found that the term wronged adoption better illustrated the focus on agency
misconduct. See id.
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